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Introduction
Anticipating future risks and opportunities that the Brazilian political system might confront was the objective of the “Brazil: 3 Periods – 2007, 2015 and 2022” Project coordinated by the Nucleus of Strategic Subjects 
of the Presidency of the Republic (NAE). The study was implemented by the 
Institute of Advanced Studies of the University of São Paulo (IEA-USP), with 
the support by the same institution’s Future Studies Program, culminating in the 
elaboration of political-institutional scenarios for Brazil on the horizon of 2022.
In this text, we succinctly describe the scenarios generated by the exercise. 
From a base in research, data and in complementary arguments, we evaluate the 
scenarios that the participants considered desirable and more probable, indicating 
two other scenarios that could frustrate the expected improvement of the political-
party and legislative institutions. Keeping in perspective that the materialization 
of the positive scenario will probably require political reforms, we analyze some of 
the reasons for the persistent resistance to their enactment.
Elaboration of the scenarios
IEA’s 2004 exercise encompassed institutional factors that inﬂuence the 
governmental decision-making process and also political factors related to the 
process of participation and of democratic representation. 
With reference to the ﬁrst, the intention was to examine restrictions of an 
institutional nature that affect the capacity of government to formulate, approve 
and implement public policies. Included were the relations among the Executive, 
Legislative and Judicial and between the Union, the States and the Municipal 
Districts; the impact of the party system in the conformation and dynamics of 
the parliamentary coalitions; and the inﬂuence of pressure groups (unions, social 
movements, NGOs, etc).
With relation to political factors, the ways in which the mechanisms of 
participation and democratic representation have been effective were questioned. 
Analysis of this question involves evaluation of the electoral system and the 
rules that structure the political party debate. Socio-cultural factors are 
equally important, acting as intervening variables capable of inﬂuencing the 
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decision-making process as much as political participation and representation. 
The exercise of constructing political-institutional scenarios for Brazil, with 
temporary markers extending until 2022, was carried out by IEA based on 
interviews with 104 political scientists and jurists. With relevant events for the 
future of the political-institutional dimension identiﬁed, the Delphi method was 
used in order to estimate probabilities of occurrence in 2007, 2015 and 2022, as 
well as the most probable and desirable future situations for each event and their 
interrelations.
Originally developed by the Rand Corporation, the Delphi method is a 
collective decision process about the probability with which certain events are 
going to occur. The name, derived from the oracle at Delﬁ in ancient Greece, 
emphasizes that the collection of procedures seeks to improve the forecasting 
of future events. The method is based on a panel of experts who are most able 
to predict the future based on their experience and intuition of what can occur 
by extrapolation from past tendencies. Rescher (1970) argued that many times 
the referral to intuitive judgement is not only an expedient, but an inevitable 
requirement in order to try to anticipate the future. Another advantage of the 
method is that the specialists need not physically meet. Nor is it recommended 
that they do, since physical proximity could facilitate the formation of biases 
favoring a dominant opinion. In the IEA exercise, consultation was done via 
the Internet, allowing the participation of experts from the entire country. The 
method also does not require a consensus of the participants, inasmuch as the 
majority opinion is represented by a median. Generally speaking, the Delphi 
method is more useful for responding to speciﬁc questions. More complex 
scenarios involving multiple factors require other methods (which were also 
used in this exercise), such as the analysis of crossed impact matrices that use 
the Delphi estimates as input. It should be underscored that the scenarios are 
constructed based on the opinions of the experts on the panels. Their anxieties 
and expectations, their vision of a better or a more probable future, certainly 
will not be the same as of another group, much less that of the population as 
a whole. 
A desirable scenario and the most probable scenario
Scenarios, according to the deﬁnition of Herman Kahn in his classic The 
Year 2000 (Khan & Wiener, 1967), seeks to describe in detail a hypothetical 
sequence of events that could arise, in a plausible manner, in a future situation. 
Drawing a sufﬁciently broad scenario, the analyst can anticipate the evolution of 
the events and identify the necessary choices in order to track a determined path.
In the exercise related here, it became convention to distinguish between 
desirable scenarios that express visions of a better political future, and probable 
scenarios, derived from more realistic perceptions of how democracy is a long 
term investment that requires strengthening of the formation of the institutional 
outline. 
Box 1, including questions addressed to the panel of experts in institutions 
and politics, shows that there is not always a correlation between these scenarios.
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Box 1 –Desirable and Probable Scenarios
Desirable Scenario Probable Scenario
Federation
New federation agreement with redeﬁnition of 
attributes and redistribution of revenue
60%
More cooperation among federal entities 60%
Deconstitutionalizing questions of safety and taxes 40%
Reduction of the disparities between regions and states 70%
Congress
Strengthening of Congress, with untying from the 
budget of revenue and its levying.
40%
Consolidation of a party system resulting in a small 
number of national parties
80%
Instituting a mixed district vote 50%
Participation
Greater social control over rendering of public services 70%
Intolerance of corruption in public life, with the 
institution of efﬁcient control mechanisms and 
recourse to exemplary punishments.
80%
Strengthening of the NGOs and para-party 
organizations on the fringes of representative 
democracy.
50%
Secularization of politics, with less activity by religious 
sects in political-party life,
(60%)
Increase in Judiciary efﬁciency and responsiveness. ( 60%)
Elimination of the normative power of the Department 
of Labor.
70%
Note: The numbers between parentheses are the complement of the percentages attributed to questions 
formulated inversely to what appears in the description of the desirable scenario. For example, the question 
“Reduction of the disparity between regions and states” was formulated as “Deepening the disparities between 
regions and states” and in this form a probability of occurrence was attributed to it as 30%.
Although there has been a foundation for the criticism that the most probable 
scenario tends to conform to the most desirable, some differences leap to the 
eye in Box 1. For example, “Strengthening of Congress, with detachment of 
revenue and imposition of budget levying,” considered desirable by the majority 
of those interviewed, received only 40% median probability of occurring by 2022. 
The same is true of what was said with respect to “Desconstitutionalization of 
questions of safety and taxes.” Reforms considered indispensable in the reordering 
of the political system, as in the case of “Instituting mixed district vote,” which 
also failed exceed a 50% probability. In other words, what is considered desirable 
is not automatically considered executable within the proposed time frame. The 
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most probable scenario, called “Republican Equilibrium,” which in part overlaps 
what the experts judge to be the desirable scenario, is summed up as follows: 
1. Cooperative Federalism. In the Brazil of 2022, there will be a signiﬁcant 
increase in governmental decentralization with a redeﬁnition of attributions 
and redivision of revenue among the Union, the States and the Municipal 
Districts. The two questions motivating reduction of federal power beyond all the 
federation questions would be the increase of criminal violence and the regional 
concentration of income. A road to the negotiation of a new federal pact is 
separating tax and safety questions from constitutional concerns, with each State 
choosing its own form of police organization and management of its taxes.
2. Strengthening of Congress. To strengthen Congress, in the perspective 
of the future, consists of untying its role concerning revenue and imposition of a 
budget, effectively transferring to the Legislative the power of deﬁning the federal 
budget and allocating revenue according to priorities determined by legislative 
members. In order for Congress to perform this role, the scenario foresees the 
emergence of a small number of large national parties, stimulated in part by the 
implementation of mixed district voting for proportional elections.
3. Social Control. Besides a new federal agreement, the future scenario 
anticipates growing control by the population over delivery of public services, 
with a view as much to universalizing access as improving its quality. Two 
factors are decisive. On the one hand, modernization of the Judiciary, with 
increase of its efﬁciency and speed. On the other, the struggle against corruption 
undertaken by organizations of civil society and to a certain extent supported by 
the modernization of the Judiciary. The crossed impact matrix analysis allows 
reconstruction of the sequence of events that give rise to this scenario. (Graphic 1) 
4. Graphic 1 – Political-institutional Scenarios to 2022.
Social Control 
Emergence of forms of 
social control over delivery 
of public services (70%) 
Cooperative Federalism 
Revision of federal agreement, 
with redefinition of taxation 
and revenues (60%) and new 
mechanisms for cooperation 
among federal entities (60%)
Strengthening of Congress
Strengthening of Congress by 
untying of revenue and Budget 
execution implementation (40%) 
Increased 
intolerance 
of corruption 
in public life 
(80%)
 Deconstitutional-
izing of questions 
of safety and taxes 
(40%)
Instituting a 
mixed district 
vote (50%) 
Aggravation of 
disparities be-
tween regions and 
States (30%)
Consolidation of a 
party system into 
a small number of 
national parties 
(80%)
Broadening of the 
political power of the 
NGOs and para-party 
organizations (50%) 
and increased activity 
of religious sects in 
political-party life (40%)
Increased efficiency and 
speed of the Judiciary 
(60%) and elimination of 
the normative power of 
the Department of Labor 
(70%)
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It is a plausible scenario, but also has debatable aspects for reasons 
succinctly listed in Box 2.
Box 2 – Plausible and debatable aspects of the most probable scenario. 
Plausible Aspects Debatable Aspects
Among the most influential Socio-
political segments there is a strong 
belief in democratic consolidation 
and in economic and social devel-
opment, as is evidenced in various 
studies of the elite conducted by the 
authors of this article between1989 
and 2002.
In the XXI century, sustainability of democracy 
will probably depend not only on the level 
of development, but also on the progressive 
reduction of inequality and of poverty.
Level of development and complex-
ity already attained by the Brazilian 
economy.
Effective retaking of sustainable growth is 
not a trivial question, since it involves risks of 
structural stagnation.
Institutional complexity of the politi-
cal system, of the Judiciary and of 
the Press.
The Brazilian index of urbanization is ex-
tremely-high and tends to catalyze some 
clearly disruptive processes, such as the 
increase of criminality and drug-trafficking 
and dissemination of weaponry. Incidence of 
corruption has to do with the created volume 
of wealth, in other words, with the economic 
growth process. Cultural factors formed in 
the historic past might have facilitated this, 
but what has in fact determined it is the 
current behavior motivated by ambitions of 
consumption and enrichment.
A representative system with sig-
nificant roots going back to the 19th
century, and which already surpass 
the critical line of  for pacification 
of confrontations and of power 
alternations.
With respect to values a disruption of com-
munalism is observed, emphasis on divi-
sions and loss of efficacy of older normative 
controls which furthermore always very weak 
in Brazil.
End of the cold war, facilitating set-
tling of the elite and attenuating the 
asperity of confrontations.
The  settling mentioned refers to the elite; 
and full inclusion of the base of the pyramid 
is a broader long term question.
These are the factors that can lead to two other less favorable scenarios, 
elaboration of which is based on the exercise. Besides their likeliness, seen 
in light of the crisis through which the country has passed, these scenarios 
serve as an alert to the fact that there are no predetermined paths for political-
institutional evolution. On the contrary, these are scenarios of gradual 
degeneration of public life.
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Conflicting fragmentation
In this scenario, conﬂict and competition prevail within the federation and 
between its powers. The relations between the Executive and the Congress are 
marked by instability, by threats and mutual retaliation. Increasing fragmentation 
of the party system and maintaining the proportional system, with dominance 
through coalition. With reduced cooperation, each federal entity struggles to 
preserve its existing prerogatives thereby hardening the present model. 
Corruption, the swapping of duties and the shameless use of temporary 
measures become the key to governing. Negotiations for approval of the legislative 
agenda follow a topical and casuistic standard with maintenance of Congress 
in the background with respect to the elaboration and execution of the federal 
budget.
The perception of weakness of the institutions undermines the attempts to 
obtain social control over public policy and party and electoral life. At the same 
time the inﬂuence of organized crime is increased over parties and governments 
and the tolerance of the electors in the face of corruption.
Democracy defended
If the hypothesis of “Conﬂicted fragmentation” underlines a process of 
political retrogression and points to future endemic and corrosive conﬂict, the 
ﬁnal scenario anticipates the Leviathan. In this scenario, the Federal Executive 
exerts strong control over institutional and political life, justiﬁed by an aggressive 
ideology of centralization of governmental actions, under the pretext of increasing 
the efﬁcacy of public politics. This directed and interventionist way tests the 
limits of the democratic regime, but in strictly legal terms does not restrain it.  In 
the federation, measures are taken by the Union via mechanisms it imposes and 
without great appreciation for the autonomy of the many federal entities. 
There is a sensitive weakening of Congress and demobilization of 
the organizations of civil society, at the same time that the insecurity of the 
population increases in the face of violence and organized crime with its growing 
inﬂuence over public institutions.
The federal Executive recurs to “temporary measures” to dominate the 
agenda of Congress. The federal budget is elaborated and executed according to 
the strictest conveniences of the government. Democratic rituals are followed 
in Congress, where a governmental coalition prevails that is formed by few 
parties with great weight. The Government implements a systematic policy of 
fragmentation of the opposition and goes on to exercise great control over the 
selection of the candidates, actively interfering in the internal life of the parties. 
In order to guarantee the balance of public accounts, the government 
adopts strongly repressive policies against evasion and imposes new modes of 
taxation. Its reaction to the growth of organized crime consists of concentrating 
powers connected to safety, increasing federal police repression and taking 
command of security policies of the States and Municipal Districts. The presence 
of the military is also increased in the border regions. Stiffening of the repressive 
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measures is justiﬁed by the rhetoric of “domestic and foreign defense” of the 
nation, silencing the critics.
The description of the two preceding scenarios illustrates the importance 
of defective institutional formation, particularly regarding the known debility 
of the political-party system. To put it in another way, democratic consolidation 
is always path dependent. Anticipation of scenarios that represent signiﬁcant 
deviations in relation to desirable and more probable scenarios requires that the 
short-term be analyzed with a focus directed toward the institutions as they are at 
the moment.
Vicissitudes of political reform
In the last three decades, an understanding has ﬁrmed among economists, 
jurists and social scientists and also among the principal multilateral agencies 
that economic and social development requires a simultaneous political-
institutional improvement process. An adequate and modern institutional outline 
contributes to economic efﬁciency and society’s well-being. In the world as a 
whole this understanding feeds research and a fruitful debate not only about 
political institutions in the strict sense, but also about systems of justice, federal 
arrangements, regulatory mechanisms etc. 
In Brazil, an eventual reformulation of the political-institutional 
structures has been intensely and practically uninterruptedly discussed since 
the Constitutional Congress of 1987-1988. Numerous suggestions and 
reform proposals have been made, notably with reference to the electoral 
system, parties, and the government. However, such proposals have many 
times arisen purely circumstantially and nearly always in a fragmentarily, i.e., 
without a necessary analytical, historical and comparative foundation. In the 
National Congress the eagerness to quickly reach practical results caused 
excessive slashing of the questions according to a “sliced” approach (recalling 
parliamentary jargon at this point). As a result society engaged in a debate of 
isolated themes without the contextualization it was owed, focussing on possibly 
relevant “trees” but without the indispensable vision of the different “forests” to 
which they pertain.
The limitations of the Brazilian political model have shouted for 
institutional reform for a long time. The key to this reform is the necessity of 
strengthening the party system as quickly as possible by reducing the number 
of parties and reinforcement of party discipline, creation of more efﬁcient 
mechanisms for coordinating the relations between  the Executive and the 
Legislative, and establishment of stronger ties between the electors and their 
representatives (accountability).
In spite of the generalized dissatisfaction with the functioning of the 
political institutions, political reform attempts nearly always failed. The reform 
neither made headway nor continued even during the government of President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, whose party, PSDB, had advocated profound 
changes in the political system. Paradoxically, the failure of political reform in 
the 1990s happened due to two success stories. When corruption shocked public 
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opinion and Congress and toppled President Fernando Collor, many proclaimed 
that the possibility of impeachment had made political reform superﬂuous. From 
1995 on reform was thought unnecessary in view of President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso’s making Congress approve an ambitious program of economic and 
public sector reforms.
Political reform entered the agenda of the Brazilian elite in the middle of 
the decade of the1980s, impelled by the perception that the electoral rules were 
not functioning adequately and that political practices threatened democratic 
government. In the 1990s, there was the inverse tendency, which made the 
question seem less urgent. The politicians continued to reiterate rhetorical support 
for political reform, but also a resistance to alter the country’s already embedded 
standard of personalized voting and ﬂuid party ties.
The absence of a formal political reform, however, did not impede political 
changes in fact. New arrangements were created beginning with initiatives 
for wholesale reform that profoundly affected Brazilian politics, such as the
coincidence of federal and state elections for shortening the presidential term. In 
1995, incited by the Upper Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral - TSE)
Congress approved the Organic Law of Political Parties in order to stiffen the 
rules for the formation and functioning of parties.
Among the innovations are found the barrier clause, according to which 
the parties have to obtain 5% of the national vote with at least 2% in a third 
of the states in order to obtain parliamentary representation. The rule, which 
was enacted in 2006, restricted access to representation in Congress of parties 
with little electoral weight. Another initiative was reelection. The constitutional 
amendment approved in 1997 allowed the president, governors and the mayors of 
large cities to run a consecutive mandate.
The aim the reform was after was the temporary measures. A constitutional 
amendment approved in 2001 limited the prerogative of the president to deﬁne 
temporary measures. The amendment also established an automatic blocking of 
the voting agenda when Congress left voting temporary measures within a period 
of 45 days.
The will to put political reform on the legislative agenda is relatively recent. 
The most ambitious project is from the Special Commission for Political Reform 
of the House of Representatives, which tries to inhibit distortions in ﬁve areas: 
1. adulteration of electoral results by party agreements in the legislative elections; 
2. weakening of political parties by extremely personalized vote; 3. the increasing 
cost of electoral campaigns and the dependence of candidates in relation to 
interest groups for ﬁnancing campaigns;  4. an excessively fragmented party 
system; and 5. Party changes, by which the party benches change size during a 
legislature.
In order to resolve these questions, the Commission proposes public 
campaign ﬁnancing, prohibited party alliances in the legislative elections and 
introduces the closed list by which electors choose candidates in order of 
preference launched by the party convention and not by name (as in the open 
list). To dilute resistance to the prohibition of party alliances, the Commission 
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suggested that the parties that want to join forces in legislative elections form 
federations. A party federation, in turn, is obliged to behave as a single legislative 
party for a minimum period of three years.
This failed to create a device for ensuring party ﬁdelity in the face 
of the presupposition that the closed list will be sufﬁcient incentive for 
politicians to remain in the party within which they were elected. It is, besides, 
debatable whether a closed list has disciplinary power over the parties and the 
parliamentarians that it is credited with, although representing undeniable 
improvement comparison to the open list in the large electoral districts in 
effect today. This matter will be returned to later on. Neither is the Special 
Commission’s proposal acceptable of reducing the national votes from 5% to 
2% as the minimum limit by which political parties qualify for parliamentary 
representation (barrier clause) as a way to make the other initiatives of the reform 
project more acceptable. 
Starting from the present crisis, combating political-electoral corruption 
(and, speciﬁcally, the search for an adequate campaign ﬁnance regulation became 
an important additional focus of the reforming effort. The decisive contribution 
to this was the discovery of a broad scheme of payments using illegally originating 
funds to motivate members to change parties in order to form majorities in 
Congress and to assure some cohesion among the weak and undisciplined 
designated parties. Already contemplated in the Caiado project, this focus made a 
strong return to the public and congressional debate.
The proposal to ﬁnance electoral campaigns with public resources is 
sufﬁciently controversial. The Special Commission Project is to distribute 
approximately  R$ 7 per voter (around R$ 800mi total) to the political parties, 
not counting the resources already distributed through the Party Fund (Fundo 
Partidário) that channels around R$ 60mi per year to the different groups in 
proportion to their respective bench sizes in the House.
The free hour on radio and television is deﬁnitely the most important form 
of public campaign ﬁnancing to democratize access to what is today the principal 
means by which candidates relate to voters. It is also a valuable resource for 
cementing party alliances. Small parties are accustomed to ceding the free hour to 
the large parties in exchange for support in disputes for chairs in the Legislative, 
which ends up encouraging the so-called “for-rent signs,” created exclusively by 
the political swapping.
The recent crisis dramatized the preoccupation with ﬁnancing via 
donations by corporations, many of them who are not regularized slush fund. 
In open list elections, raising and spending campaign money is the candidate’s 
responsibility, and not the party’s. But there is no requirement for reckoning the 
accounts for political parties, a lapse that can be used to cover up the receiving of 
illegal donations. Subjecting the expenses of the parties and candidates to auditing 
and effective sanctions in the case of transgressions of legal limits for expenditure 
is a condition sine qua non for campaign ﬁnancial reform. The recent proposal 
of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) for establishing a coordinated action with 
the Tax Bureau for inspecting campaign donations with periodic reckoning of 
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actual expenditures could signiﬁcantly reduce the amount of abuse, although its 
elimination should not be expected.
The faults of the present system do not, however, constitute sufﬁcient 
argument for the substitution of exclusively public sources of ﬁnancing. 
Transgressions occur in all systems, and transferring the burden of complete 
campaign ﬁnancing to the public budget will not eliminate the “caixa dois 
(double books)” resource, reestablishing by crossover paths the inequality of 
electoral competition that is intended to be eliminated. Maintaining ﬁnancing 
with public and private resources as occurs in the majority of countries still seems 
the most adequate solution.
The debate about political reform 
since the 1980s: recapitulation
Throughout the last two decades, an agenda of political reform was seeded 
in a base of proposals presented within the orbit of the National Congress and 
also by external commissions – among which are the Afonso Arinos Commission 
appointed in 1986 by the Presidency of the Republic, and the Commission of 
Studies for Constitutional Revision created in 1992 by IEA-USP. Recapitulation 
of these works shows that the debate has distinct phases. The ﬁrst should 
be understood as based on the process of constitutional elaboration – the 
Constitutional Committee, in 1987-1988, and the Revision, determined by the 
Transitory Devices, which should have occurred in 1993. An encompassing vision, 
an intention for profound reorganization of the political system, prevailed at the 
very ﬁrst, as was necessary, with important changes in the electoral and party 
systems and through a proposal for the adoption of a parliamentary model, in 
relation to the system of government itself.
With the defeat of the parliamentary proposal in the Constitutional 
Committee and, once again, in the national vote of 1993, many defenders of the 
reform lowered their expectations. In the second stage, the discussion remained 
alert to the difﬁculties of reform by the normal process, through amendments 
to the Constitution and the dominance of the public agenda through other 
priorities, notably in the economic area, after the implementation of the Real Plan 
and the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. 
In the new picture, political reform went on to be conceived in an 
incremental manner (“sliced”, as the political jargon usually puts it), with more 
limited and speciﬁc initiatives and greater conﬁdence in changes eventually 
derived from the political system either functioning or indirectly produced by 
structural reforms in the economic and State realms.
The road effectively followed up to that moment was a combination 
of timely interventions with changes inbred generated by the political system. 
The general direction of political reform proposals corresponds to the original 
diagnosis of the debates and the preliminary project elaborated by the Afonso 
Arinos Commission. This statement is applicable to the “verticalization” imposed 
by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) in response to a council shaped by the 
PDT. Contested in relation to the decision-making method as much as to its 
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rigorousness, such rule is not distinct in spirit from the anxiousness to strengthen 
and nationalize the party groups that guided the Commission’s work. Other 
proposals resulted in speciﬁc conjunctions, without clearly noticing their future 
consequences, as occurred in the coinciding of federal and state elections triggered 
by the reduction of mandates. Viewed together, it was possible to realize that the 
reform process has a direction or conceptual anchor, but did not follow a rigid 
blueprint, immune to zig zags and uncertainties.
The principal themes of the political reform agenda that were sown in the 
last two decades are the following.
“Consensual” or majority democracy?  
In retrospect, the government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
might come to be evaluated as one of the most effective in Brazilian history, but 
it is debatable to what measure it bequeathed irreversible improvements in our 
standards of governing. The performance of different presidents certainly varied 
over time, but the quality and effectiveness of the Brazilian political system 
continues to be an open question.
The key question seems to be that it refers to a system structurally oriented 
to dispersing and diluting political power, continually eroding the power and 
the cohesion of any majority that is formed. It is not a coincidence that this 
description strongly evokes consensual democracy, in contrast to the majority 
model (also known as the (Westminster model).
The majority model tends to be considered more effective and intelligible 
to the ordinary citizen than the consensual model. The reason is that reaching 
consensus among agents with power of interdiction in order to make relevant 
decisions is better managed in a majority system.
Stability of the regime and organization of powers
Dispersal of political power in Brazil is generated by a combination of 
multi-partisanship, government of coalitions, strong bicameralism, a robust 
federalism, veriﬁcation of constitutionality (judicial review) and an extensive 
and detailed Constitution protected by rules that require higher majorities for 
amendment approval.
The Brazilian political system is a combination of the consensual and 
presidential system that, in the end, is democratic governance. The existence of a 
highly fragmented and undisciplined party system beside an inefﬁcient Judiciary and 
an extremely decentralized federal structure complicates governability even more. 
In the case of Brazil and of a goodly portion of Latin America 
presidentialism cum the consensual system tends to further weaken already weak 
institutions, since at the moment that presidents are confronted with the loss 
of party and parliamentary support the temptation becomes almost irresistible 
to bypass Congress and appeal directly to the “people.”  Populism (or the 
plebiscite) is an always present temptation in systems characterized by a low level 
of institutional consolidation and in which the Executive sees itself obliged to 
surmount in some way the obstacles generated by the consensualism. 
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In the institutional context described here, the Executive seeks to bypass 
the Legislative and the Judiciary (especially in relation to abuse of the prerogative 
of passing legislation), while the other two Power and a myriad of “consensual” 
institutional agents react trying to buckle the Executive via favors from via 
parliamentary and party politics based on the distribution of resources and share 
of power, or even seeking to undermine and delegitimize presidential power. 
This is one of the reasons why the debate about parliamentarism versus 
presidencialism has not completely disappeared, in spite of the unfavorable results 
of the parliamentary system of government reached by two national referenda 
(plebiscites) conducted in the last forty years, in 1963 and in 1993. The imprecise 
demarcation of the borders between the three Powers is aggravated by the 
interdiction power of “consensual” institutional agents that operate within each 
of them. Concerning the Judiciary, positive aspects could be underscored, but 
also detrimental aspects, in its growing interventions to assure rights and arbitrate 
conﬂicts.
The judges’ freedom even from the very ﬁrst instance to make different 
decisions in similar cases and the power conceded to them to paralyze public 
policies has stimulated society to seek the solution to its social and political 
conﬂicts in the Judiciary. The result has been the twin ills known in public 
debate as the “judicialization of politics” and the “politicization of the Judiciary,” 
these maladies that overburden the courts and compromise their capacity to be 
impartial.
In addition to this, the reach of veriﬁcation of constitutionality is such 
that the courts are inevitably dragged into the political arena. The Judiciary can 
deliberate about the constitutionality not only about ordinary laws approved 
by the Legislature or the temporary measures published by the Executive, but 
even constitutional amendments, given its power to question whatever it wants 
to of any one of these instruments, as it wishes to, in relation to the merit or the 
method of deliberation by which the decisions were made.
Effective decision-making power 
As previously underscored, Brazil has a political system more accustomed 
to blocking than making decisions. As healthy as this might seem from the point 
of view of abstract democratic theories preoccupied with the limits of government, 
its cost in terms of democratic effectiveness is indubitably very high. 
With respect to the relations between the Executive and the Legislative the 
principal means of administering the nearly continual impasse generated by our 
institutional structure is the broad presidential prerogative of creating temporary 
measures – a rose with the smell of the old military regime demands. Inserted into 
the Constitution, this legislative instrument rapidly turns into an uncontestable 
source of power that is the Executive tramples in order  to overcome obstacles 
placed by the fragile and fractured structure of the country’s party and legislative 
system. 
It is important to recall that from 1988 on all the conceivable obstacles 
to stabilization and economic reform embedded within the Constitution could 
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only be removed by an amendment approved by 60% of the total number of 
parliamentary members of the two Houses of Congress, in two separate turns 
of voting. Keeping in view that the larger parties have difﬁculty controlling 20% 
of the chairs of each one, this means that during all this period the Executive 
remained at the mercy of Congress to make constitutional reforms required in 
innumerable areas.
Acting in the opposite direction, the prerogative of the legislator by means 
of temporary measures, to which is delimited by very vague requirements of 
relevance and urgency, puts the Executive in a privileged position in relation to 
ordinary legislation. Seen from this angle, it is not inappropriate to describe the 
norm for Brazil’s relations between the Executive and Legislative in the following 
terms: Congress is hostage to the Executive in questions related to ordinary 
legislation (i.e., provisionary measures), while the president is hostage to Congress 
in relation to questions that demand constitutional reform.
Even if the premise were acceptable with reference to using temporary 
measures that do not ipso facto signify the emasculation of Congress, as some 
authors have argued, the abundant editing of these edicts brings on a serious 
distortion in the democratic legislative process, which could only be understood 
and tolerated as a means of turning around some of the deep defects in the 
Brazilian institutional structure.
The merely rubber-stamp character of the federal budget, execution of 
which is subordinated to the power of the Treasury in scheduling the expenditures 
approved by the Congress, also deforms the legislative process, notwithstanding 
its importance in assuring the ﬁscal adjustment. Aggravating this distortion when 
the mechanism is used for controlling voting of the Executive’s interest through 
selective release of resources by parliamentary amendments.
Accountability: parties, party fidelity and the electoral system
The period 1988-1990 marked a transition from a moderately fragmented 
party system to another, highly fragmented one. In 1994, Brazil was certainly one 
of the democracies that showed the highest degree of fragmentation.
Besides the legislative fragmentation, the larger parties, especially those 
integrated in the governmental base of President Fernando Henrique (PSDB, 
PFL, PTB and, much later, PMDB and PPB) had little discipline in contrast to 
the then opposition of the left which marched in unison. Although some of the 
authors defend the idea that the large Brazilian parties act in a discipline manner 
and that their behavior is predictable rather than chaotic, the fact of a minority of 
10% to 15% vote consistently against the majority of the party on key questions 
tends to aggravate the inherent problems of a fragmented legislative system. 
Starting from a minority position and supported by the large but little disciplined 
parties the presidents have no option other than to form multiparty coalitions of 
exaggerated size and high ﬁnancial cost.
Something similar occurs on the voter’s level. The Brazilian voter in the 
face of an excessive number of options, ﬁrst because there are a large number of 
parties and second, because none of the larger behave in a consistent manner, 
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either in the electoral arena or in the legislature. By increasing the costs of 
information for the electors, the legislative fragmentation coupled to party 
lack of discipline dissolves the lines of responsibility (accountability) between 
representatives and represented.
Notwithstanding the difﬁculties enumerated here, the party system seems 
to have improved. This can be attributed in part to the indirect impact of the 
economic reforms of President Fernando Henrique’s government, or perhaps the 
constitutional reform of 1997, which instituted the reelection, or even the timely 
political reforms that have been approved until the present. This tendency of 
improvement also left roots in the coinciding of the presidential and legislative 
elections and should be favored in the case of de facto single candidate election 
district standard that already prevails in many regions scattered throughout the 
country.
One option still more adequate would be to preserve the salutary 
characteristics of the open list system, adopting a mixed system that would 
combine majority run-offs in single-name districts with proportional elections of 
the closed list in state contexts.
The mixed district system provides good advantages. The single-name 
majority elections can increase the intelligibility of political competition, because 
such disputes tend to be decided between two candidates. The candidates that 
run on a closed list would have to compete for votes by offering encompassing 
programs and not favoritism (cronyism?). The system also provides the 
responsibility of the representatives in front of well deﬁned geographical electoral 
bases. Being signiﬁcantly smaller in size than the present electoral context, the 
single-name district would allow voters to clearly identify their representative and 
charge them with responsibility for subjects of interest to them.
 Popular versus Federal Sovereignty
The difﬁculties that originate in the Brazilian consensual model are 
exponentially greater for certain speciﬁc aspects of our federation, contributing to 
the complexity of the political system.
Federal arrangements are inherently consensual and a convincing argument 
could be made in favor of their adoption by continent-size countries.. However, 
at least two aspects claim greater attention in the Brazilian situation. The ﬁrst is 
that the 1988 Constitution reacted against the centralized government promoted 
by the military regime by instituting a radical decentralization. Besides having 
transferred a substantial part of the tax returns of the Union to other federal 
entities, it conceded full political and administrative autonomy not only to the 
States but also to the municipalities, transforming Brazil into a genuine federation 
with three levels of government.
From a political and electoral point of view, Brazil today is a composite 
of a national government, 27 State governments and more than 5,560 local 
governments. As more healthy as this arrangement might seem, the sad truth is 
that some States and at least half the municipal governments do not have sufﬁcient 
revenues to sustain themselves. One of the consequences of this discrepancy 
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between the autonomy of local politics and ﬁnancial dependency on the central 
government is that the quality of democracy practiced in the municipal districts 
leaves much to be desired. 
Adding to this, the consensual argument, in some federations, has been 
invoked in order to justify under-representation of the electoral majorities in 
favor of over-representation of the less populous states. This has been for some 
time a bone of contention in Brazil, especially in view of the dramatic under-
representation of São Paulo and the over-representation of sparsely peopled areas 
in the North and Center-West areas. Alfred Stepan coined the odd expression 
demos-constraining (i.e., reducing the power of the popular majority) to refer to 
this characteristic that, from a comparative perspective is particularly prominent in 
the Brazilian federation.
Conclusion
According to the original diagnosis of the proposals of political reform 
formulated in the 1980s, the essence of the Brazilian institutional problem 
is the combined problem of the presidential regime with strong traces of the 
“consensual” model of democracy, in other words, an electoral and party system 
conceived in order to impede the formation of governmental majorities. The 
resultant difﬁculties of this model, in the case of Brazil, are aggravated by 
extreme individualism fomented in the legislative elections by the open list’s 
proportional vote.
One point highlighted in the present text was the Brazilian mixture 
of presidencialism cum consensualism beginning to function better in the 
government of Fernando Henrique from 1995 on. On the one side this became 
possible due to the less polarized atmosphere  that emerged at the end of the 
cold war and the new world agenda, and on the other, by control of inﬂation 
and the rise to presidency of a politician not only capable of  building consensus 
but also armed with a broad agenda of reforms. It is also plausible to state that 
the functioning of the political system was indirectly transformed and in practice 
as a consequence of the economic and public sector reform. Privatization of 
state banks and the Law of Fiscal Responsibility represented a hard blow to the 
centuries-old practices of cronyism and corruption. 
According to this hypothesis, even without a political reform in the stricto 
sensu, the conditions had changed signiﬁcantly by which political parties and 
individual politicians considered their actions. Although they had done relatively 
little to reform the political institutions, the important transformations that 
occurred in other spheres will alter their functioning in the middle term. Public 
opinion came to value the monetary stability, ﬁscal discipline, and modernization 
of the public sector but there is much still to be done with reference to the 
questions of redistribution as well as others related to law and public safety.
Election of President Lula in 2002 should be understood as a consequence 
and also as a cause of the expressed changes in cultural politics, notably touching 
on the peaceful manner of presidential succession and alternation of power. 
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In particular, the line of continuity that the new government maintained 
in relation to political macroeconomics represented an important additional 
contribution to democratic consolidation– without impeding the substantive 
controversies that enabled it to occur.
The political crisis that engulfed the government and PT after May, 2005 
gave evidence of the convenience of a profound debate about political reform in 
the following years. Although relevant, the deceptive changes up to the present 
did not seem sufﬁcient to assure stability, effectiveness and a desirable index 
of accountability in the political system. The elevated political cost and the 
demonstrable inefﬁciency embedded in the valid political-institutional model was 
again manifest with unusual force in Lula’s government. It provided evidence of 
the resources needed for the PT’s use in order to attract smaller parties and with 
small programmatic content and thus form a majority coalition in Congress.
The robust formal and informal Brazilian democracy should not be 
underestimated since the 1980s. Differently from what occurred with José Sarney, 
Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco, presidents Fernando Henrique and Lula were 
beneﬁciaries of a substantial advance: the strong expectation of stability originating 
in inﬂation control and from a much broader political-electoral base.
If the experience of these twenty years is a good guide for analysis, it could 
be conjectured that serious crises only will occur if at least two of the following 
three factors arise simultaneously: 1. an economic situation felt to be extremely 
adverse for the majority of the population; 2. plausible accusations of corruption 
that reach the person of the president himself; and 3. a climate of antagonism or 
lack of conﬁdence in the political environment, with a substantial share of political 
agents of the ﬁrst degree (president, party politicians, Congress, governors), 
mutually attributing some intention of provoking animosity or of creating 
destabilizing facts.
Today’s widespread conﬁdence with respect to democratic consolidation, 
shared by this text, is however much more tied to the practical experience acquired 
in overcoming serious individual crises of the last presidents and apparently 
irreversible economic changes than it is to the health of political institutions in 
their formal conﬁguration. This observation by itself indicates a deepening of the 
debate over political reform. It is possible that the 2006 presidential election will 
reopen the discussion, hopefully renewing its terms and preparing its third stage.
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ABSTRACT – THIS ARTICLE reports the results of a political scenario-building exercise 
carried out by the Institute of Advanced Studies within the framework of a larger 
project sponsored by the federal government. The authors ﬁrst draw a positive 
scenario, characterized by political stability, improvement of the party system and of 
the legislative machinery, and better social policies. Next they turn to two negative 
scenarios, under which the above-mentioned goals seem unlikely to be reached. The 
positive scenario is unlikely to come about without substantial political reforms. An
effort is therefore made to analyze reform proposals debated in the country over 
the last two decades, with special reference to those aiming to strengthen the party 
system, improve Executive versus Legislative relations and increase accountability in 
the political system as a whole.
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